Shinobi’s Strawman is a weekly sequence the place our Technical Editor Shinobi challenges the Bitcoin group, aiming to fire up dialog round heated technical debates.
We’re going to strive one thing of an experiment right this moment.
Drivechains are being proclaimed by some because the savior of Bitcoin, the reply to all of its issues. It solves the long run safety finances, permits full freedom to include new options into Bitcoin, and presents no downsides for current Bitcoin customers.
Sounds too good to be true? It’s:
1) Drivechains Change Miner IncentivesDrivechains introduce a hodgepodge of recent variables into miners’ incentives, and after introducing that instability advocates push for customers merely adopting a degraded safety mannequin for all new use instances and performance by utilizing a sidechain in lieu of adjusting the bottom layer. How is that this any totally different than an outright assault on Bitcoin self custody?
2) Present Sidechains Have No AdoptionThere have been many alternative design proposals for sidechains through the years, however the one at present deployed ones are run by federations (Liquid and RSK), each of which have failed to realize any significant stage of adoption since they have been deployed. Does this imply sidechains usually are not price continued improvement effort? Or are they price it, and the failure of federated chains to be adopted is solely the results of shortcomings in that particular sidechain design?
3) Drivechains Exacerbate The Dangers Of MEV
MEV is one thing that’s potential on Bitcoin already, as programs like Stacks are demonstrating, however at present the types of MEV potential on Bitcoin are both generated by completely unbiased altcoins like Stacks (which traditionally have trended to an insignificant proportion of miners’ earnings, like Namecoin), or very low within the stage of complexity (like frontrunning Inscriptions). Drivechains open the door to arbitrarily complicated types of MEV on sidechains, whereas additionally guaranteeing that the token producing that MEV is pegged to the value of Bitcoin. I.e. it can’t merely fade away to an irrelevant fraction of miner earnings as folks cease shopping for an altcoin. This drastically worsens the dangers and potential injury of MEV on Bitcoin.
4) No, Swap Markets Aren’t An AnswerPaul Sztorc replied to a few of these issues on Twitter, however these responses do probably not deal with the basis points. Swap markets may sound like a solution, however the actuality is that these simply shove the liquidity necessities onto yet one more occasion, assuming they may present large quantities of liquidity for nearly nothing in return. That may work for small scale utility customers, or having liquidity obtainable to arbitrage uncertainty across the peg, I don’t assume it is a foregone conclusion that sufficient liquidity to cowl the “resolution to the safety finances drawback” with out slippage is a given, to say nothing of all the opposite customers who would wish to swap out and in. He then goes on to disregard the distinction between a mainchain reorg, which requires redoing work and power expenditure, versus a sidechain reorg which doesn’t. Lastly, he equates a random particular person for no logical or revenue pushed motive giving cash away with somebody producing a revenue with an exercise they’re the only gatekeepers of.
Look, finally, I’m a Bitcoin maximalist. I need what’s finest for Bitcoin.
I feel drivechains are silly, harmful and a waste of time, however I wish to hear your ideas on the topic. Am I unsuitable concerning the factors above? Is there one more reason that I must be towards drivechains that I’ve missed?
Please don’t write to me with some random hopium. I’m open to novel opinions. I need the dialog to progress. Above is my finest summation – we merely aren’t wherever near a significant consensus on drivechains.
My DMs are open. Opinion@bitcoinmagazine.com. Let’s hash it out.